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BOOK REVIEWS
ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS. By
Paul Ramsey. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978.
Pp. xvii, 353. $15.00.
Reviewed by L. Harold Levinson*
Professor Paul Ramsey,' writing as a Christian ethiCist, 2 has
revised, extended, and updated the Bampton Lectures in America
that he delivered in 1975 at Columbia University. The resulting
book is Ethics at the Edges of Life: Medical and Legal Intersections.
A substantial portion of the book is devoted to critical analysis of a
number of landmark court decisions, all of which were rendered
after his delivery of the Bampton lectures-Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,I on abortion; Commonwealth v. Edelin,I on the treatment
of a fetus during or immediately after an abortion; In re Quinlan,5
on the termination of life support; and Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz,' on the decision not to provide life-
prolonging treatment. The book also analyzes a statutory post-
Bampton development-the 1976 California Natural Death Act.'
The author's blending of the lectures with the subsequent cases
and the statute is not completely smooth, but some major themes
emerge from the book. Ramsey strongly criticizes the courts for
disregarding the value of the lives of the fetus and the. terminal
patient. He views the court decisions as "a magnifying glass held
up to the moral fabric of this nation, through which we can see
clearly what is happening (or what has happened) to us as a peo-
ple." But while suggesting in this passage that the decisions reflect
the moral decline of the country, he argues at other times that
legislatures, rather than courts, reflect the will of the people. This
latter argument could lead to the conclusion, although Ramsey does
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A., University of Miami, 1957; LL.B.,
University of Miami, 1962; LL.M., New York University, 1964; J.S.D., Columbia University,
1974.
1. Professor Ramsey is Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Religion at Princeton Uni-
versity and author of numerous books and articles on medical ethics.
2. In his preface the author states: "I do not hesitate to write as a Christian ethicist."
P. RAMSEY, ETHics AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERsECTIONS xiii (1978).
3. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Litigation about the constitutional aspects of abortion has contin-
ued, including the recent decision in Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979).
4. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2795, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
5. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
6. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1979).
8. P. RAMSEy, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis in original).
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not pursue it, that the will of the people is reflected by the Missouri
statute that prohibited abortion rather than by-the court's decision
in Planned Parenthood invalidating that statute. A significant part
of the book is devoted to the advocacy of new legislation, 0 appar-
ently based on the assumption that the moral decline of the country,
while reflected in the unpalatable court decisions, will not be re-
flected in statutory law.
With regard to abortion in the aftermath of Planned
Parenthood, Ramsey urges the enactment and enforcement of con-
science clauses to free institutions and individuals from participat-
ing in abortions against their convictions." Ramsey's conscience
would be offended by any abortion after conception, except when
necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.12 As the fetus
approached viability, his conscience would demand further than an
abortion, if carried out at all, be done in a manner that maximizes
the possibility of delivery of a live fetus, and that if this possibility
materializes, the fetus must receive a standard of post-natal care
equivalent to that given other newborns. 3
At the other end of life, Ramsey urges a "medical indications
policy" as the means of determining when to give or continue life-
support measures. Although this term appears in numerous pas-
sages of the book," no completely clear explanation can be found.
Apparently, Ramsey's proposed medical indications policy would
withhold treatment from patients whose death is imminent and
inevitable, except to provide comfort and companionship. All other
patients, including those incurably ill but not dying, would receive
the type of treatment medically indicated. This does not necessarily
mean the most aggressive possible treatment, because the risks in-
volved may convince a physician that such treatment is inappro-
priate. It does mean that when medically indicated, treatment
would be given even to patients who are incurably ill to "add life to
their years" even though it may be impossible to "add years to their
life."
After the rather discursive style of most of the book, Ramsey
offers an extremely tight summary of his conclusions on "The Last
of Life." He argues that it is essential to distinguish:
9. See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 26, 137, 329.
10. See, e.g., id. at 33, 61, 137, 329.
11. Id. at 43-93.
12. Id. at 46-48.
13. Id. at 26-39.
14. See, e.g., id. at 159, 181, 264.
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(1) between (a) conscious decision to refuse treatment in one's own case and
(b) withholding treatment in the case of another; (2) between (a) "terminal"
patients who are dying and (b) "terminal" patients who are simply incurable;
(3) between (a) medical help and (b) prolonging dying; (4) between (a) biologi-
cal indices for medical help and (b) socioeconomic measures of burden or
advantage to come for the primary patient; or (5) between (a) medical help
for a primary patient and (b) relieving the burden or serving the advantage of
others."
In a footnote accompanying the above text, the author presents a
"tabulation" that "might be made of some of the conclusions sug-
gested by the foregoing chapters."
If 3a and 4a are the case, lb is not morally permissible for 2b, 4b or 5b reasons;
la may be morally permissible or even praiseworthy for 2b, 4b or 5b reasons
even if 3a and 4a are the case; lb is morally permissible if 2a; 2b patients, given
that la is not the case, should be evaluated for treatment in terms of 4a and
5a and the availability of 3a; lb is morally permissible even if 4a is the case,
if there is no 3a or if to attempt 3a would likely do more harm; la is morally
permissible if 2a.1
An important feature of Ramsey's argument is that a conscious
decision to refuse treatment in one's own case (category la in his
tabulation) is morally permissible in some but by no means all
situations. This point is emphasized elsewhere in the book:
[Tihere are medically indicated treatments that a competent conscious pa-
tient has no moral right to refuse, just as no one has a moral right deliberately
to ruin his health. Treatment refusal is a relative right, contrary to what is
believed today by those who would reduce medical ethics to patient autonomy
and a "right to die.""
Here, then, is a basic conflict between Ramsey's ethical values and
the current state of American law. Although some exceptions can
be found, the general legal principle is that a competent, conscious
person has a right to choose his own lifestyle even if it is injurious
to his health. 8 Moreover, an individual has the right to decide
whether to seek professional health care," and if he does seek such
care, he has a right to know the diagnosis, the feasible alternative
methods of treatment, and the method recommended in his case.20
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id. at 330 n.17.
17. Id. at 156.
18. See generally L. TRIBE, AMEucAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 15-12 to 15-21 (1978).
Obvious exceptions are found when a person's lifestyle is injurious to others in the sense
traditionally prohibited by law, such as murder, robbery, and the like, or when the person is
under a special institutional regime, such as military service, in which individual lifestyle
preferences traditionally have been subordinated to the requirements of discipline, uniform-
ity, and preparedness.
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 15-19. The obvious exception arises if the condition of a
person's body, as a carrier of infection, endangers others.
20. The patient's right to know is fundamental to the contemporary law of informed
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He also has a right to refuse treatment.2 ' For a number of reasons,
however, the patient does not have an absolute right to obtain what-
ever treatment he desires. First, the treatment may be prohibited
by law.22 Second, there may be no physician in the community
capable of providing the treatment.2 Third, a physician may dec-
line giving the treatment because rendering such treatment to any-
one would violate the physician's conscience. 24 Finally, a physician
may decline to render the treatment because in his professional
judgment the treatment is not medically,appropriate in the particu-
lar case.2 These matters will be discussed later in greater detail.
Starting with the notion of the autonomy of the competent,
conscious person, the legal system has recognized that children,
comatose, and other legally "voiceless" persons may be represented
by surrogates-parents, legal guardians, guardians ad litem, or in
some circumstances, court orders. The surrogate, however, does not
have as free a hand as the competent, conscious person. For exam-
ple, a competent adult is permitted to donate one of his own organs,
but at least some case law prevents a guardian from consenting to
the donation of a child's organ.26 Moreover, when the patient is a
pregnant woman, there are additional complexities because the
rights of both the mother and the fetus must be considered.2 Ram-
sey, like the legal system, acknowledges that surrogates speaking for
the voiceless have less authority than the competent, conscious per-
son possesses when speaking on his own behalf.28 Ramsey also finds
consent. See G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS 57-58 (1975); Capron, Informed
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974).
Failure to advise parents of the risks involved in a pregnancy recently was held to subject
the physician to liability in Becker v. Schwartz, 47 U.S.L.W. 2426 (N.Y. Dec. 27, 1978). The
controversial exception to the patient's right to know involves the physician's "therapeutic
privilege" to withhold information if the patient would be harmed by receiving the truth.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Satz v. Perlmut-
ter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978); G. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 79-91.
22. The Supreme Court's abortion decisions, for example, have left the states with
considerable opportunity to regulate abortions after viability. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-
64 (1973); L. TuBE, supra note 18, § 15-10.
23. The size of the "community" in which medical care is sought in a particular case
varies, no doubt, depending on the source of payments for travel, medical care, loss of
earnings, and other expenses, and on the level of aggressiveness with which the patient seeks
treatment.
24. For a discussion of the "conscience clauses" enacted by many jurisdictions, see P.
RAMSEY, supra note 2, at 51-93.
25. AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 6.
26. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1973). See also Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
27. See note 22 supra.
28. P. RAMSEY, supra note 2, at 330 (item No. 1 of his tabulation).
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special problems when dealing with fetal rights. 29 But consistent
with his restrictive view of the autonomy of the competent, con-
scious person,30 compared with the relatively broad autonomy recog-
nized by the legal system with regard to such persons, Ramsey also
believes that the moral choices available to surrogates and to preg-
nant women are narrower than the choices presently allowed by the
legal system. Consequently, Ramsey sees patients and their surro-
gates as enjoying broader freedom under the law than they may
morally exercise. In his scheme the moral constraints are to be man-
aged by a "medical indications policy," which is, to a considerable
extent, a version of "doctor knows best." Ramsey does not propose
a rigorous set of guidelines for health care professionals in the exer-
cise of this controlling function, since he appears to assume that
sound medical practice, based upon the traditions and ethical stan-
dards of the health care professions, can be relied upon.3 '
Since health care professionals, specifically physicians, occupy
such an influential position in Ramsey's system, Ramsey would
have enhanced the value of the book by dealing at some length with
the various rights enjoyed by such professionals, both under the
legal system and according to the author's moral values. An analysis
of the legal rights of professionals could be designed to parallel
closely the general principles regarding the rights of patients. With-
out straining too much to achieve such parallelism, one could sug-
gest that just as a potential patient has a right to choose his own
lifestyle, a potential professional, if qualified, can decide whether to
enter into a particular profession.32 As a potential patient has a right
to decide whether to seek professional health care, the potential
provider of that care has a right to decide whether to accept the
patient, except in emergency situations or special circumstances
when the provider of health care services is under the obligation of
an innkeeper or common carrier to accept all comers.3 3 Once a pa-
tient has sought care from a willing professional provider, the pa-
tient's right to know is matched by the provider's right to receive
from the patient such reasonable cooperation as a truthful medical
history.34 Finally, the patient's right to refuse treatment is matched
29. Id. at 46-48.
30. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
31. This is inherent in his "medical indications policy." See text accompanying note
14 supra. See also P. RAMSEY, supra note 2, at 210.
32. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 15-14.
33. AMA PRNcIPLEs oF MEIcAL Emcs § 5.
34. Sometimes, however, the patient may be unable to rely on the privileged nature of
his statements to the physician. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
19791 1027
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
by the provider's right to refuse to render services for any one or
more of the reasons previously indicated-illegality, incapability,
violation of conscience, or medical inappropriateness.
One could argue that traditional notions of the physician's right
to refuse to render services are broad enough to permit the physician
to consider many factors in deciding what treatment is medically
appropriate, including some factors that do not focus solely upon
the welfare of the patient. Practices such as the "benign neglect"
of defective newborns,3 the order "Do Not Resuscitate" on the chart
of a hospitalized patient,3 1 and the termination of life support in
Quinlan-type situations37 reveal that the physician's decision on
"medical appropriateness" takes into account factors such as the
financial and emotional burden to the family and to the community,
rather than the welfare of the patient. If one regards the fetus while
in utero as a "patient," the argument could be extended to assert
that when a physician is asked to perform an abortion, he finds
himself dealing with two patients-the pregnant woman speaking
for herself and the "voiceless" fetus. The welfare of this latter pa-
tient is subordinated to that of the woman if the abortion is per-
formed and the fetus does not survive.
This view of the loyalties of the physician-sometimes divided
between multiple patients, sometimes between the patient and his
family, and sometimes between the patient and the com-
munity-brings to mind the divided loyalties of the lawyer. The
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) reflects the traditional view that within the bounds of the
law and subject to the lawyer's obligation to serve the system as an
officer of the court, the lawyer must be a zealous advocate for his
client.3 1 Occasionally, the Code requires the lawyer to give primacy
to his role as officer of the court even though doing so may hurt the
client.3 1 One explanation of the major cases treated in Ramsey's
book is that the courts, drawing upon their familiarity with the
divided loyalties of the lawyer's practice and building upon the
portion of the medical tradition that also recognizes divided loyal-
ties in some situations, have established relatively permissive guide-
lines because they trust the physician to decide where his primary
loyalty should be placed. This interpretation leads to the question
35. P. RAMSEY, supra note 2, at 189-227.
36. Id. at 228, 290, 322.
37. Id. at 269-99. See also Havighurst, Blumstein, & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwrit-
ing the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoBS. 122, 140-45 (1976).
38. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (as amended Aug. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
39. See, e.g., id. DR 7-102(B), DR 7-106(B)(1), DR 7-109(A).
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whether Ramsey's "medical indications policy" or deference to the
"doctor knows best" tradition is an effective guarantee that the
welfare of the patient will always be paramount.
Ramsey fails to point out that when a person, whether a patient
or a professional, makes a choice, this may narrow the range within
which future choices can feasibly be made. In the abortion context,
for example, the choice whether to abort, and if so by what method,
is by no means the first choice facing the pregnant woman. She
already has gone through a series of choices within the framework
of the uncontrollable factors of her life. Each choice tends to limit
the available range of future choice. Some choices such as general
lifestyle, marital status, types of friends, and what hobbies or em-
ployment to pursue were made before conception. Another choice,
except in cases of rape, was whether to engage in intercourse, and
with whom, 0 and whether to take contraceptive precautions. Other
choices remain available-whether to seek early information on
pregnancy; whether to undergo amniocentesis to discover any
anomaly in the fetus; whether to seek an abortion and, if so, how
early in the term. Ramsey's moral outrage at the courts' permissive
attitude toward abortion could be directed, in large part, against the
earlier choices that lead to the point when abortion becomes one of
the only feasible alternatives.
Ramsey's outrage could also be directed against a state of af-
fairs that strangely is ignored throughout the book-the social sur-
roundings that tend to make abortion an attractive option when
compared with the alternatives. As Justice Blackmun observed in
Beal v. Doe: "There is another world 'out there.' "4 The same opin-
ion sketches some of the considerations that are meaningful for pro-
abortion advocates: "[T]he cost of a nontherapeutic abortion is far
less than the cost of maternity care and delivery, and holds no
comparison whatsoever with the welfare costs that will burden the
State for the new indigents and their support in the long, long years
ahead."" An ethicist certainly should say something about a society
that appears to favor abortion because it costs less than maternity
care and delivery or because a live birth will produce a new welfare
recipient who over many years will drain society of far more re-
sources than would be expended by obtaining an abortion at public
expense. Mention is also surely required of the well-known argu-
40. This choice, of course, is subject to legal limitations established by laws in some
jurisdictions prohibiting adultery and fornication. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 130 N.J.
Super. 234, 326 A.2d 84 (1974); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1338 (1972).
41. 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
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ment that abortions will always take place, legally or otherwise, and
that a law against abortion inevitably leads to the performance of
illegal abortions under conditions posing serious hazards to the
health of the pregnant woman.43 This stark social background may
not demonstrate that abortion is justifiable on moral grounds, but
it at least demands consideration. Otherwise, the moralization can
hardly be taken seriously by those who are "out there."
Ramsey's discussion of the moral problems of patients and phy-
sicians is not followed through by a discussion of lawyers' problems,
although the book is subtitled "Medical and Legal Intersections."
Lawyers will recognize quickly that the above analysis of the rights
of the health care professional could be adapted as an outline of the
rights of lawyers. Potential lawyers are free to decide whether to
enter the profession, assuming they meet the necessary qualifica-
tions." They generally are free to decide whether to accept proffered
employment, except when in the position of a common carrier," and
they are entitled to reasonable cooperation from the client." Law-
yers are also free, even required, to decline to render services when
their duties as officers of the court override their duties as zealous
advocates." Still unsettled is the extent to which a lawyer may or
should decline to render services when he morally disapproves of the
legally permissible end result his client seeks." This problem is the
lawyers' equivalent of the conscientious objection of physicians to
43. See, e.g., id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. ABA CODE, supra note 37, DR 1-101(B).
45. Id. EC 2-26 to EC 2-33; DR 2-109.
46. Id. DR 2-110(C)(1).
47. Id. DR 2-110.
48. This question is, to some extent, an aspect of the lifestyle that the lawyer chooses
during the course of his professional career, subject to occasional modification if the lawyer
is requested by a court or other appropriate institution to serve as appointed counsel in a
special situation. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility implies the distinction be-
tween the general course of a lawyer's practice, when he is "under no obligation" to accept
all comers but "should not lightly decline proffered employment," EC 2-26, and the special
situation of appointment by a court or request by a bar association, when the lawyer
should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling
reasons. Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject
matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, the
belief of the lawyer that the defendent in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of
the lawyer regarding the merits of a civil case.
Id. EC 2-29.
Professor Murray Schwartz has recently proposed a distinction between the advocacy
role and the nonadvocacy role of the lawyer. According to Schwartz, a lawyer acting as
advocate is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the
ends achieved, provided the lawyer abides by the established rules of professional behavior.
By contrast, Schwartz favors adoption of a rule that would restrain the nonadvocate lawyer
from using unconscionable means or working for unconscionable ends. Schwartz, The Profes-
sionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978).
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rendering certain types of services.
Beyond these generalities, some specific questions of profes-
sional responsibility arise when lawyers encounter matters of the
type addressed in Ramsey's book. A lawyer whose client is seriously
ill arguably has the responsibility to make aggressive efforts to vin-
dicate his client's right to know the diagnosis and the alternative
treatments being considered, and to counsel with the client about
obtaining additional medical opinions. He also has the duty to re-
spect the client's wishes on the extent to which these matters may
be revealed within the circle of family and friends, to advise the
client regarding the preparation of wills, powers of attorney, and
other dispositive instruments, and to act in the best interest of the
client if incompetency or guardianship proceedings are instituted.
Finally, he has a responsibility to interact with counsel for the hos-
pital and physicians to minimize the risk of conflict.
Ramsey has failed to grapple with value conflicts between legis-
latures and courts, between a physician's loyalty to the welfare of
his patient and his loyalty to other concerns, between an individ-
ual's theoretical freedom of choice at the time of crisis and the
constraints that he has placed upon himself by a series of prior
choices, between social realities and moral statements regarding
abortion and life support, and between law and morality as applied
to the matters addressed in the book. This criticism is not addressed
to Ramsey's moral standards themselves. Rooted in the Judeo-
Christian heritage, their value is unimpaired by time or technol-
ogy." But Ramsey's standards are not likely to convince the uncom-
mitted unless weighed against the secular concerns of the individu-
als and communities involved. Ramsey does indeed engage in spir-
ited criticism of other ethicists, but on a level of abstraction that
does not permit this reviewer to relate Ramsey's moral values to the
realities of life as lived by the consumers of professional services."o
49. For a contemporary commentary on orthodox Jewish family lifestyle, see Z. POSNER,
THiNK JEWISH 101-08 (1978). Ramsey frequently acknowledges that his values are derived from
Judeo-Christian sources. He makes frequent and approving references to traditional Jewish
sources of interpretation, and he relies upon some Christian sources while rejecting others.
Though the theological aspects of Ramsey's book are beyond the scope of this Book Review,
his values reflect the teachings of orthodox Judaism and of those segments of Christian
teaching most closely aligned with it. Some contemporary Jewish and Christian scholars
undoubtedly would take issue with these teachings and with Ramsey's conclusions. It also is
obvious that valuable moral standards are found in many sources in addition to Judeo-
Christian teachings.
50. One final comment must be made. Readers of Ramsey's book are likely to be
distracted by the numerous typographical and syntactical errors it contains. Without making
any effort to proofread, I noted the following errors. A suggested correction is added after each
error: overboard (overbroad), p. 8; Justice Steward (Stewart), p. 29; overboard (overbroad),
1979)1 1031
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
SAMUEL JOHNSON. By W. Jackson Bate. New York and London: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1975. Pp. xxii, 646. $20.00
Reviewed by J. Allen Smith*
"The applause of a single human being is of great consequence." This he said
to me with great earnestness of manner, very near the time of his decease, on
occasion of having desired me to read a letter addressed to him from some
person in the North of England; which when I had done, and he asked me what
the contents were, as I thought being particular upon it might fatigue him, it
being of great length, I only told him in general that it was highly in his
praise;-and then he expressed himself as above.'
I.
With the observation that "Samuel Johnson has fascinated
more people than any other writer except Shakespeare," 2 Professor
W. Jackson Bate of Harvard University opens this profound biogra-
phy. Now available to readers for more than three years, with the
immediate excitement of its publication well-passed, the book
clearly stands out as the quintessential presentation of the life of
Johnson and as a monument of its genre. The force of Bate's book
results from his ability to combine research and literary talents.
From a vast amount of material, Professor Bate has ferreted out the
essential data for the composition of a portrait that depicts Johnson
as the whole man, his eccentricity and greatness blended to perfec-
tion. Moreover, Bate has compiled his findings in a manner both
pleasant and instructive that makes his presentation an indepen-
dent work of art. Consequently, Bate's book surely will attain the
p. 35; denied certification (certiorari), p. 83 n.34; alledged (alleged), p. 107; umblical cord
(umbilical), p. 125; in now way (no), p. 127; He reading of the instructions (His reading), p.
128; kill the bady (baby), p. 128; Stanford Law Review 27, no. 2 (January 1973) ((1975)), p.
197 n.15; looses its force (loses), p. 216; convenant (covenant), p. 217 n.41; principle author
(principal), p. 241; impell (impel), p. 245; superceded (superseded), p. 253; regretably (re-
grettably), p. 264; conceference (conference), p. 267; competent conscience patient (con-
scious), p. 273 n.10; Judge Muil (Muir), p. 273 n.10; sub silencio (silentio), p. 280 n.17 (three
times); to us a wedge argument (use), p. 295 n.26; guardian of litem (ad), p. 305; precedental
(precedential), p. 306; Judge Cardoza (Cardozo), p. 306 n.5; Saikewiczs (Saikewicz's), p. 315;
supercede (supersede), p. 320; terminal conditional (condition), p. 322; application . .. serve
only to postpone (serves), p. 325; dispensible (dispensable), p. 327. The moral legacy of the
millenia deserves more careful expression.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University. B.A., Erskine College, 1942; J.D., University of
Florida, 1948; S.J.D., Yale University, 1958.
1. 7 J. BoswELL, THE LWE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 64 (C. Shorter ed. 1922) (1st ed. London
1791).
2. W. BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON 3 (1975). Bate continues: "Statesmen, lawyers, and physi-
cians quote him, as do writers and scientists, philosophers and farmers, manufacturers and
leaders of labor unions." Id.
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rank of a classic in the literature of biographies. It will be placed
alongside the study of Lord Melbourne by Lord David Cecil3 and the
two most important biographies in the English language, Johnson's
life of the early eighteenth century poet Richard Savage' and James
Boswell's The Life of Samuel Johnson,5
In achieving his results, Bate accepts and follows Johnson's
advice. As to style, Bate develops his fresh twentieth-century Eng-
lish prose-no exaggerated adjectival embellishments and no senti-
mentality-from the eighteenth-century structure and rhetorical
charm of Joseph Addison, of which Johnson wrote: "Whoever wishes
to attain an English style, familiar but not coarse, and elegant but
not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the volumes of
Addison."' Bate does not, it is true, display the magic with words
that Thomas Macaulay wielded in his nineteenth-century essay on
Johnson.' Bate has neither the conventional, anecdotal relief that
led to the success of Joseph Krutch's Samuel Johnson,8 nor the
lively paced journalism of John Wain's more recent tribute.9 In-
stead, Bate keeps himself off stage, eschews purple passages, and
uses his lean style only for his main purpose, which is to demon-
strate how Johnson achieved his own fulfillment.
Along the way, but only to develop the character of Johnson,
Bate introduces other persons, beautifully delineated but always
members of the supporting cast. Mrs. Hesther Thrale, for example,
emerges as a perceptive, loyal friend who achieved fulfillment in
part by observing her mentor, despite her having to keep Johnson
from his wishes to possess her. One finally sees her worthy of John-
son's tribute that her "kindness . . . soothed twenty years of a life
radically wretched." 0 Similarly, Bate looks carefully at David Gar-
rick and Joshua Reynolds, not to introduce unamusing trivia about
two of Johnson's famous friends, but rather to demonstrate how
Johnson, with regard to them, overcame one of his principal vices,
envy. This vice, for Johnson used a religious vocabulary rather than
one drawn from modern psychology, along with sloth were his two
chief shortcomings. With the use of willpower and reason Johnson
3. D. CECIL, MELBOURNE (1954).
4. JoHNsoN, Savage, in 2 LIVES OF THE ENGuSH Poxm 321 (G. Hill ed. 1905) (1st ed.
London 1779).
5. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 1.
6. JoHNsON, Addison, in 2 LIVES OF THE ENGLISH PorTs, supra note 4, at 79, 150.
7. Macaulay, Life of Samuel Johnson, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (8th ed. 1856),
reprinted in MACAULAY: PROSE AND POETRY 548 (G. Young ed. 1952).
8. J. KRUTCH, SAMUEL JOHNSON (1944).
9. J. WAIN, SAMUEL JOHNSON (1975).
10. Id. at 363.
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overcame his jealousy of the two artists who had been rich when he
was poor.
Both Garrick and Reynolds became greater as they reacted to
Johnson's intellect and honor. Bate recounts how Garrick, while
studying under Johnson at the latter's Edial Hall grammar school
in Lichfield, perfected the ability to mimic his teacher. Garrick
observed Johnson carefully on many occasions; he even eaves-
dropped on Johnson in his bedroom. For entertainment, Garrick
would enact some of Johnson's eccentricities, including a lovemak-
ing scene between Johnson and his wife-one of Garrick's most
successful routines. On the positive side was Garrick's recitation, at
the opening of the Drury Lane Theatre, of his mentor's Prologue
with its concluding injunction that "truth diffuse her radiance from
the stage."" When Garrick died, Johnson wept and wrote, in a
manner worthy of Shakespeare's tribute to Hotspur in Part One of
Henry the Fourth, an obituary to his younger friend: "I am disap-
pointed by that stroke of death, which has eclipsed the gaiety of
nations, and impoverished the public stock of harmless pleasure."'
Another example of Johnson's capacity for sustained friendship
was his relationship with Reynolds, who was earning 8,000 pounds
a year when Johnson received his pension of 300 pounds. Despite
this diversity of fortune, Reynolds always remained Johnson's clos-
est friend. Reynolds gave his view in the noble portrait he painted
of Johnson. From the painting one comprehends the intelligence
and grace that enabled Johnson to transcend poverty and a physical
appearance that caused him to appear to Horace Walpole as "an
unfortunate monster trusting to his helpless deformity for indem-
nity for any impertinence that his arrogance suggests . . . .
Reynolds' last tribute, spoken just days before Johnson's death,
matches the portrait: "His work is almost done; and well has he
done it! ""
Bate introduced other characters as well: Boswell, Johnson's
unusual house guests who came to stay, and most importantly, two
older men who Johnson admired in his youth-the Reverend Corne-
lius Ford, a comparatively rich cousin of Johnson, and Gilbert Wal-
mesley, the son of a member of Parliament for Lichfield. These two
fairly well-born men of the world helped to shape Johnson's abiding
"establishment" orientation, his delight in affairs of state, his treat-
11. Johnson, Prologue at the Opening of the Theatre in Drury Lane, (1747) (line 62),
reprinted in SAMUEL JOHNSON: SELEcrED WarriNGs 46, 47 (R. Davies ed. 1965).
12. J. WAIN, supra note 9, at 351.
13. J. KRUTCH, supra note 8, at 351.
14. Id. at 554.
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ment of social themes from within rather than from without society,
and his ability to overcome that frequent curse of the self-made
man, envy or resentment. Bate presents Johnson's youth among
elderly parents in a Tennessee Williams setting-ill-directed talent
in a vain fight for gentility, and an environment of poverty that was
hard for those at the cruel bottom of the Johnsons' social class,
especially when that class itself was at the periphery of worldly
adequacy.
Bate acknowledges one great advantage that he had-the
availability of enough raw material to reach the real Johnson.15 Bos-
well's biography of Johnson was the first thorough attempt at what
today is called oral history, a method by which the person being
written about speaks for himself. Macaulay thus called Boswell "the
first of biographers,"" and went on to say that because of Boswell's
study, "Johnson grown old, Johnson in the fulness of his fame and
in the enjoyment of a competent fortune, is better known to us than
any other man in history." This method is the key to the success
of two present works that rank as minor classics: Paul B. Fay's
intriguing study of President Kennedy, The Pleasure of His
Company," and Merle Miller's biography of President Truman."
Interestingly enough, Johnson understood the superiority of relying
on this method of oral history. He remarked to Boswell that
"nobody can write the life of a man, but those who have eat and
drunk and lived in social intercourse with him." 20 There is indeed
something disciples of a master (especially those of Jesus and Plato)
can relate that later followers do not easily grasp; but even in this
matter, despite the passage of two centuries, Bate comes close to
equaling Boswell. In addition to having Boswell's recorded conver-
sations, Bate puts to use a lesson he learned from the poet John
Keats, who believed that Shakespeare and Johnson wrote allegories
of their own lives. With a close reading of Johnson's writings, espe-
cially The Vanity of Human Wishes2' and Rasselas,22 Boswell and
the other original sources, Bate assembles his own biography of
15. See W. BATE, supra note 2, at xx.
16. Macaulay, Essay on Croker's Edition of Boswell's The Life of Samuel Johnson,
L.L.D. (1831), reprinted in 1 CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS CONTRIBUTED TO THE Edinburgh
Review 347, 365 (F. Montague ed. 1903).
17. Id. at 370.
18. P. FAY, JR., THE PLEASURE OF His COMPANY (1966).
19. M. MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN (1974).
20. 3 J. BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 198.
21. Johnson, The Vanity of Human Wishes (1749), reprinted in SAMUEL JOHNSON: SE-
LECTED WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 48.
22. S. JoHNsoN, THE HISTORY OF RASSELAS, PRINCE OF ABIssINIA (1971) (1st ed. London
1759).
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which one can say, as Johnson said of John Milton's Paradise Lost,
"[H]is work is not the greatest of heroick poems, only because it
is not the first."23
II.
Today, approximately two hundred years after Johnson's
death,2 4 many in the legal profession may consider his life and work
as both interesting and instructive, and may attempt a serious
study of Johnson as a man and as a jurisprudential thinker. First,
one may wish to reflect on Johnson as a man, not only as an eccen-
tric man of letters, as a man about London, and as one of the
greatest conversationalists known to the English language, but also,
more importantly, as a model for each of us to follow as we seek to
overcome obstacles and to produce something of value along the
way. In writing his book, Bate follows the tradition of the study of
the hero, a tradition encapsulated in Henry Wadsworth Longfel-
low's lines, "Lives of great men all remind us/We can make our lives
sublime."" Bate offers a further philosophical basis for incorporat-
ing the hero into daily life by quoting his teacher, Alfred North
Whitehead: "[M]oral education is impossible apart from the ha-
bitual vision of greatness."2
The variety of ways in which Johnson became a great man is
the theme of Bate's long book. It is sufficient to note here that
Johnson's most impressive achievement was keeping himself rela-
tively free from mental breakdown. His written work and his care
and nurture of others depended upon the maintenance of a sound
mind. Even so, Bate suggests persuasively that at least twice John-
son suffered mental loss to a serious degree. With this challenge to
his sanity always before him, Johnson set out to discover a way of
life, a method for controlling his energy, for making choices, and for
arranging priorities that would enable him to discover and to follow
productive and sane directions. To give meaning to the world and
to himself, he accepted in full faith the Christian religion, as it was
defined by the best of the eighteenth-century Church of England
divines.Y In short, he discovered for himself both final principles
23. See Johnson, Milton, in 1 LIVES oF THE ENGLISH PoErs, supra note 4, at 84, 194.
24. Johnson lived from 1709 until 1784.
25. H. LONGFELLOW, A Psalm of Life (1839) (lines 25-26), reprinted in THE PomricAL
WORKS OF LONGFELLOw 2-3 (Cambridge ed. 1975).
26. W. BATE, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SAMUEL JOHNSON x (1955). In this earlier work, Bate
developed his view of the moral function of biography and in large part his view of Johnson.
Bate's major work twenty years later is a richer development of his earlier book.
27. See 30 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 31, 32 (1892). Johnson also was influ-
enced by the writings of William Law. See W. LAw, SERIOUS CALL (London 1728). This book
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and a method in which to apply these principles to daily situations.
Much of this intellectual voyage is depicted allegorically in his
poem, The Vanity of Human Wishes,"1 which he concludes by call-
ing for "a healthful mind" to take action in small matters, actions
to be taken as heaven declares the "measure." Despite his pessi-
mistic belief that as to large matters all is vain, he called for action
in both the Stoic and the Christian sense. In the Stoic sense, he not
only captured the spirit of his Roman model, Juvenal, but also
reflected something of the conclusion in Valery's great twentieth-
century poem, "The wind risbs/we must try to live!"" In Rasselas
and in his biography of Savage, Johnson preached against day-
dreaming, against the unharnessed imagination, against romantic
ventures, which being impossible to achieve and unconnected with
reality, could lead to a split personality and, indeed, to the disinte-
gration of the self. In his writings, Johnson called for action in small
cases, for concern for individuals as distinct from causes, for the
possibility of seeing the universe in the cell (or as Walt Whitman
would put it later, in the blade of grass), for the challenge of meeting
one new soul each day. His preoccupation for what one would call
the case at hand, or the facts, kept him from bondage to his chief
sin, as he called it, sloth. The forcq that permitted him to hold on
and to keep going he labeled "Reason." By nature Johnson was not
a reasonable man; he was a waif, a term Bate enjoys. Johnson wan-
dered the streets, liked publicans and sinners, roamed about at
night dropping coins into the hands of sleeping abandoned children,
drank until he finally had to give up spirits altogether, talked with
artists and especially with artistes manques, and somewhere in his
consciousness at all times pondered the overwhelming thoughts of
death, resurrection, and the last judgment. In achieving a successful
personality in the psychological sense, he relied on reason. He pre-
dated Sigmund Freud with a startling self-analysis, and is as mod-
ern as Jean-Paul Sartre in his emphasis on free will.
Turning to the second point of continuing interest about John-
son, his contribution to jurisprudence and theories of social order,
it is hard to characterize precisely his contribution because he did
not put himself forward as a philosopher. Instead, he was the first
successful journalist, or man of letters, or commentator, or anchor-
similarly influenced the Wesleys. One biographer of Law stated that "even [Sir Edward]
Gibbon speaks of it [Serious Call] with high respect." 32 DIcrIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
236, 239 (1892).
28. Johnson, supra note 21.
29. P. VAutRY, Le Cimetiere Marin (1920) (lines 139-40), reprinted in MORCEAUX CHOISIS
34, 39 (1930) ("Le vent se 16ve! . . . II faut tenter de vivre!").
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man. He more resembles Edmund Wilson than George Santayana.
In truth, his type is better known in France, where he would be
recognized as a moralist, with modem examples being Andre Gide,
Frangois Mauriac, Henry de Montherlant, Albert Camus, and, in
one aspect, Sartre. Even in this area he was too much an activist, a
public man, to develop a system of thought at the highest level. As
a thinker, he cannot easily be placed alongside any of his three great
contemporaries, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Fran-
cois Marie Arouet de Voltaire. His was a public voice speaking to
immediate issues. He did not develop an original point of view.
When Johnson achieved his greatness in England he spoke for
the establishment, or at least a large part of it. The establishment
was Christian and Protestant. The Johnsonian establishment was
separated from the Catholic establishment in Europe and from the
nonestablishment Catholics in Canada. Although Johnson con-
cluded that no serious barrier existed between Protestants and
Catholics, their differences being merely formal, he remained to-
tally separated from two classes of persons who are especially promi-
nent in present western society-"free-thinkers" and "enthusiastic
Christians." Today, most jurisprudential scholars do not discuss
their values in terms of Christian doctrine, as Johnson would. Nor
do these scholars stress death and the final judgment after resurrec-
tion as their principal interest. Johnson felt that most human action
kept people from thinking about these awesome matters, which to
him were the real and vital questions.
In today's Christian community, Johnson would be uncomfort-
able with the large number of enthusiastic Christians who testify to
special revelations, movings from within, and nonrational methods
of learning. Since he had remarkable compassion for the poor, John-
son would approve of the social gospel to which these enthusiastic
Christians are strongly committed. He would not have accepted,
however, their minimization of the use of reason in arriving at jus-
tice and salvation because to Johnson reason was a chief instrument
of the Holy Spirit. Johnson lived before he could study Immanuel
Kant and long before the Christian thinkers had the help of Carl
Jung and Karl Barth. Certainly, Johnson would have arrived at a
broader interpretation of the faculty of reason, given the develop-
ment a century later of the social sciences and psychology. He would
have accepted the new disciplines, subject to critical scrutiny. De-
spite a shield of arrogance to cover his wounds, Johnson had the
modesty of Isaac Newton, whom he revered as a scientist and as a
Christian. Neither Johnson nor Newton thought he knew more than
a little, and neither thought he could do, even at best, more than
1038 [Vol. 32:1032
BOOK REVIEWS
small tasks. Johnson doubtless would have liked to repeat Newton's
words:
I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have
been only like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and
then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the
great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me."
Johnson did not analyze alternative values because he believed
that his values had been given or revealed by God. His enemy was
Hume, not because Hume proved the impossibility of teaching ulti-
mate values by reason, but because Hume would not affirm John-
son's view of revelation. To Johnson, the "hereafter" was true, not
because its existence can be proved, but because the Bible re-
vealed it. Hume would not accept this leap of faith. Johnson be-
lieved that the revelations of the Bible, refined by Church doc-
trine, could be applied to human experience. Some today reject
this approach and use human happiness as the measure for their
values, while others base their values on their understanding of
man's fundamental nature.
In the same year, Johnson in RasselasM and Voltaire in
Candide3 2 came to the same conclusion-one must cultivate his own
garden. Johnson, however, did not accept Voltaire's belief in prog-
ress and in the utility of social action on a broad, planning stage.
Voltaire stressed the here and now; Johnson stressed the future life.
Johnson's message developed into W.H. Auden's injunction in his
Phi Beta Kappa poem at Harvard: "[Take short views."33 John-
son's rejection of large schemes as futile does not mean that he
rejected large-scale principles or values. He was a believer in natural
law, "truth," "justice," "love," and "duty." In his major poem he
wrote that all men "from China to Peru" possess the same desires,
passions, and human ingredients." Johnson dismissed Rousseau's
belief in innocence and the primal state of good because these obser-
vations ran against both Johnson's experience of iniquity and his
belief in original sin. Bate seeks to put Johnson's development
within the philosophy of Whitehead by writing: "To go back to the
living and concrete nature of experience was the first principle of his
[Whitehead's] thinking.""5 Again, with Whitehead and Johnson in
30. 40 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 370, 392 (1894).
31. See S. JoHNsON, supra note 22.
32. F. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE ou L'OPmsMSME (1759).
33. W. AUDEN, Under Which Lyre (line 174), reprinted in W.H. AUDEN: COLLECTED
POEMs 259, 263 (E. Mendelson ed. 1976).
34. Johnson, supra note 21, at 48 (line 2).
35. W. BATE, supra note 26, at ix.
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mind, Bate urges the reader to retain at all times an awakened sense
of "the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality."', Thus,
although Johnson did not develop a position in jurisprudence or
philosophy, he ranks with the great teachers of ethics-Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Blaise Pascal, Andre Gide, Bertrand Russell, and
even Michel de Montaigne. His total seriousness about the possibil-
ity of justice in daily life, combined with his pithy expression and
trenchant observations, make him a good introduction for more rig-
orous minds such as Aristotle, Plato, and Kant, who operate on a
more difficult plane. Although Johnson remains in a subordinate
tier of thinkers, he is in the first ring of teachers.
Regarding Johnson's intellectual powers, it is interesting to
speculate on the quality of his mind and to raise the question
whether he was a genius, and even if he was not a genius, to surmise
how to rank him with the best minds of the legal profession. The
use of the term "genius" requires care and explanation. Johnson
defined the word as one used to describe "a mind of large general
powers, accidentally determined to some particular direction."3 If
we accept his definition, then it is clear to all that Johnson was a
genius. He could have led a government, supervised a physics labo-
ratory, managed the Ford Foundation or the World Bank, and com-
manded either General Motors or Sears & Roebuck. That he pos-
sessed the special endowment of Hume, Newton, Johann Sebastian
Bach, or Albert Einstein is less certain. His closest American legal
counterparts are Roscoe Pound and Chief Justice John Marshall.
Felix Frankfurter reportedly described Pound as a quasi-genius; of
Marshall, Daniel Webster said that he had never met a brighter
man. 38 Johnson's friend, Mrs. Thrale, demonstrated remarkable
understanding when she remarked that "[h]is soul was not differ-
ent from that of another person, but . . . greater.""
To summarize, Johnson's two contributions to jurisprudence
are the following: (1) he represents an articulate, even brilliant,
position for a Christian lawyer who believes that the ultimate values
on which legal systems ought to be based are values revealed by God
to man in scripture and theological teaching; and (2) he represents,
to a wider group, the power and success that a thinker can obtain
by the use of reason in applying values to concrete situations.
36. Id.
37. J. KnUTCH, supra note 8, at 68.
38. Smith, Book Review, 85 YALE L.J. 454, 458 (1976) (reviewing L. BAKER, JOHN MAR-
SHALL: A LFE IN LAw).
39. W. BATE, supra note 26, at 8.
1040 Vol. 32:1032
BOOK REVIEWS
III.
An interesting debate recently published in the Arkansas Law
Review" conveniently illustrates in a contemporary context the
method that Johnson would employ in solving constitutional ques-
tions. This debate concerns Professor Raoul Berger's view of the
judicial function and Professor Robert E. Knowlton's larger view of
the role of the Supreme Court. Berger, according to Knowlton,
"believes that the sole basis for constitutional interpretation is the
original intention of the draftsmen."" Berger, quoting Professor
Philip Kurland, posits the issue in this debate as going to "the most
immediate constitutional crisis of our present time . . . the usurpa-
tion by the judiciary of general powers on the pretext that its au-
thority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment."" Without re-
viewing Berger's position, which is well-known through his writings,
it suffices here to place him with the fundamentalists and the strict
constructionists. Even Justice Hugo Black, a leading fundamental-
ist, is too broad for Berger because Black sought to incorporate the
Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment without a clear under-
standing of the views of the persons who participated in the process
of amending the basic document. Once Black accepted incorpora-
tion, he held on to the historical-fundamentalist dogma with the
tenacity of an old-style evangelist making exegesis of scripture.
The purpose here is not to toss aside this view, which haq had
enough strength to hold the fort for liberty under successive attacks
on the first amendment, but rather to stress Knowlton's view, which
is in large measure the position to which Johnson indubitably would
have arrived. Speaking eloquently for the American liberal tradi-
tion, Knowlton says: "[tihe words of the Constitution may be
viewed as representing basic principles or values that the framers
meant to protect. The role of the Court is to relate and to protect
those principles and values in today's society."" The values of
which Knowlton speaks, such as free speech, freedom from torture,
and religious freedom, are identified clearly in the Bill of Rights.
For many lawyers these rights are sufficiently discoverable in the
Constitution; consequently, inquiry into the origin of these rights
beyond the text of the Constitution is unnecessary. Nor is a search
40. The debate referred to was between Knowlton, Book Review, 32 ARK. L. REv. 157
(1978) (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT), and Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Facts vs. Generalities, 32
ARK. L. REV. 280 (1978) (written in response to Knowlton's review).
41. Knowlton, supra note 40, at 158.
42. Berger, supra note 40, at 280.
43. Knowlton, supra note 40, at 162.
1979)1 1041
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for the source of rights or the ultimate nature of justice required.
More mature scholars, including of course Berger and Knowlton,
understand that the founders siphoned these values into the Con-
stitution from the ideas of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment
in England and France. The debate between Knowlton and Berger
is how to apply these values in a modem setting.
Johnson would have agreed with Knowlton that the values
should be applied to the new setting with the fullest use of reason
and experience and with the best knowledge possible of the chang-
ing historical environment. Johnson, always with a definition
handy, declared that "the law is the last result of human wisdom
acting upon human experience for the benefit of the public."" John-
son believed that values were "natural," God-given, and revealed
through the Christian-classical tradition. According to Johnson,
these values could be applied to solve problems, including judicial
or legislative controversies. Johnson believed, however, that they
could be applied with only limited success because the mind's cor-
ruption leads to delusion. This pessimism resulted from Johnson's
understanding of original sin. Knowlton takes a more optimistic
view of the possibility of improving the social order through the use
of reason. But both Knowlton and Johnson would agree that the
success, limited or great, depends upon the application of reason to
a very specific, concrete situation. Knowlton and Johnson properly
could reach different solutions to the same problem because each
occupy different historic positions. The important point is that they
would use the same process. It is Johnson's method of moving from
principle to facts, or, conversely, from facts to principle, in the
actual moment, that makes him a gifted teacher, thinker, and ju-
rist.
IV.
Disinterested observers are noting an important phenomenon
in the American legal profession-a resurgence of interest in juris-
prudence. For a long period, the American legal profes-
sion-students, teachers, lawyers, and judges-to a great extent
have based their understanding of law and justice on legal positivist
methods and principles, which have been accepted and acted upon
rather than articulated and questioned. New law school courses and
current literature suggest a trend towards natural law. This lauda-
44. Piozzi, Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson, L.L.D., (London 1786), reprinted
in 1 JonNsoNuN MIscELANIEs 141, 223 (G. Hill ed. 1966). Mrs. Piozzi was none other than
Mrs. Hesther Thrale, Johnson's longtime friend and hostess, who remarried shortly after her
first husband's death.
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ble movement for the construction of a strong, widely shared juris-
prudential base is accompanied by a second important and comple-
mentary theme-a renaissance in the comparative study of law and
literature." This renaissance is indicated by an upswell of profes-
sional interest in the study of literature and humanitarianism as
they relate to matters of justice. This dialogue between law and the
liberal arts serves two functions. First, selected literature of the first
rank, such as Plato's Apologia, Sophocles' Antigone, and Shake-
speare's Measure for Measure, focus so sharply on some of the ulti-
mate issues of justice that these works are indeed jurisprudential to
the same degree as the technical masterpieces of John Austin, Hans
Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart. Second, literature, such as the biogra-
phies of Johnson and some of his writings, serves as a vehicle for
students who wish to begin coordinating positive law with larger
considerations, and who wish to begin the long, hard, and rewarding
study of jurisprudence or other branches of philosophy, the queen
of sciences. In response to this movement, law schools are beginning
to incorporate into the curriculum large servings of jurisprudence in
different packages and wrappings. Educators are increasingly aware
that what were once called "policy questions" need further empha-
sis and refinement. "Policy" under the emerging regime is not re-
garded as a hunch, or as an egocentric grasping for one's own way,
but rather as a serious, systematic attempt to define the ends and
means of justice.
Educators now must decide how to gain the most from this new
interest in policy, values, justice, and jurisprudence, which appears
in various forms and rubrics. Professor James C. N. Paul, for exam-
ple, suggests that curriculum committees divide the courses in law
school on a fifty-fifty basis between courses on law and courses
about law." Courses about law include: law and psychiatry, law and
literature, law and sociology, law and anthropology, and jurisprud-
ence, which can subsume the others. In mixing these elements in the
crucible of legal education, Dean Peter Simmons of Rutgers Univer-
sity School of Law shares precious discretionary funds for experi-
ments in the new jurisprudence by way of public lectures, seminars,
and conferences. The undergraduate prelaw curriculum at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts is gaining national and international at-
tention because it builds a humanistic and jurisprudential founda-
tion for further professional training. Some believe that for this
humanistic movement selected literary figures, including Johnson
45. See Smith, The Coming Renaissance in Law and Literature, 7 MD. L.F. 84 (1977).
46. Based on an interview with James C. N. Paul, Professor of Law at Rutgers Univer-
sity, in Newark, New Jersey (May 15, 1978).
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perhaps, are indispensable. These teachers believe that truth re-
sides in Shakespeare, Alexander Pope, and John Milton, not in
escapism, and that their verities can help solve practical questions.
The legal profession's increased interest in jurisprudence and
literature as it relates to law is encouraging. Jurisprudence, how-
ever, must develop rigorously trained and articulate spokesmen;
there are encouraging developments here as well. Four scholars,
John Rawls, David A. J. Richards, Ronald Dworkin, and Roberto
Manaberia Unger, now working in their prime, may be cited as a
brilliant constellation in American scholarship. They differ so de-
cidedly in background and personality that it would be inaccurate
to suggest that they share a unified theory. For present purposes,
however, it is helpful to call them neo-natural law thinkers to distin-
guish them from the prevailing English school of positivism. There
is space in this essay for only a few comments to illustrate the
richness of their work. Recently, in the Vanderbilt Law Review,"
Professor John D. Hodson brilliantly reviewed Dworkin's book,
Taking Rights Seriously." Hodson suggests that Dworkin should
draw closer to Kant to justify the finality of his policy choices. John
Rawls is now America's leading savant in these matters, and his
book, A Theory of Justice," could reach the status of a classic. He
relies heavily on Kant, as well as Rousseau, and in seeking the
source of values, he looks to the Swiss and French structuralists.o
In a key sentence he states: "We need a conception that enables us
to envision our objective from afar: the intuitive notion of the origi-
nal position is to do this for us."51 Concerning the source of our
values, Rawls states:
It must be emphasized that a moral view is an extremely complex structure
of principles, ideals, and precepts, and involves all the elements of thought,
conduct, and feeling. Certainly many kinds of learning ranging from reinforce-
ment and classical conditioning to highly abstract reasoning and the refined
perception of exemplars enter into its development.5
Richards, whose ideas are similar to Rawls and who has established
a separate equivalent system, gives his major book the appropriate
title The Moral Criticism of Law.53 Professor Stephen R. Munzer,
who has recently reviewed this book, offers interesting observations
to be considered when reading Rawls, Richards, and Dworkin. Mun-
47. Hodson, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REV. 450 (1978).
48. R. DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGMs SERIOUSLY (1977).
49. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
50. See id. at 460. Note especially Rawls' emphasis on Jean Piaget.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at 461.
53. D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRIcIsM OF LAW (1977).
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zer demonstrates the weaknesses in all three as they seek to justify
their moral (value) preference. 4 The careful, detailed criticism in
the Hodson and Munzer reviews underscores the vigor of the juris-
prudential movement.
Unger opened up American jurisprudence to Continental
thought. In his approach he provides a place for what Johnson
would call revelation. Despite his thorny style, which is not im-
proved by a stream-of-consciousness veneer, Unger's work is mag-
nificent. He is attempting to return the legal profession to its preli-
beral metaphysical underpinnings. 5 The last words in Unger's Law
in Modern Society could have been written by Johnson: "[T]he
deepest insight is likely to be gained when one is in passage from a
more general to a more particular perception, or from the particular
to the general."" Johnson would have emphasized that the process
of deciding cases involves three key elements: (1) the clarification
of values; (2) the understanding of the facts; and (3) the use of
reason to apply values, principles, and truth to the facts. Johnson
received his values and truths from his religion, from well-
understood and clearly articulated theological tenets. By accepting
these tenets, Johnson was able to spend most of his time with partic-
ulars, issues of the day, problems of neighbors, facts. Today, Chris-
tian lawyers must look to the neo-Kantian scholars and to thinkers
of Unger's type to incorporate Christian principles into a jurispru-
dential system because modern law does not posit its values on the
Bible. Since the ultimate values of Christians, now and in Johnson's
time, are based on scripture and revelation, a modern Christian
finds it difficult to work in systems that exclude metaphysics and
transcendentalism. Although it would be foolish to speculate
whether Johnson would completely approve of Unger, Johnson cer-
tainly would expect jurisprudence to account for love and would
probably approve of Unger's conclusion: "Love differs from respect
because it prizes the loved one's humanity in the unique form of his
individual personality."57 In reviewing Unger's Knowledge and
Politics," Professor Karsten Harries summarizes:
Central to Unger's position is the assumption that there is "a unitary human
nature"; this nature should not be thought of as a timeless essence; rather it
"changes and develops in history." It is this nature which constitutes the final
54. Munzer, Book Review, 31 Rur. L. REv. 153 (1978). See also Munzer & Nickel, Does
the Constitution Mean What It's Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1977).
55. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN Sociurr (1976).
56. Id. at 267-68.
57. Id. at 207.
58. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLTICS (1975).
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basis of moral judgment in the absence of objective values and in the silence
of revelation."
With Harries' aid one can begin to penetrate Unger's thicket of
obtuse sentence structure to catch some of the spirit of Johnson and
other metaphysical polemicists. It is of interest that Unger in his
first chapter cites Professor Bate, who had earlier written on the
learning process and the effect that great men have on succeeding
generations."
Regarding the new moralists as a group, Johnson would be able
to comprehend readily their statements, digest all their thoughts,
place his conclusions in computer form, and spike some of their
darker passages with his aphorisms. Moreover, he would join them
in testing the application of their systems to current issues such as
sexual freedom, capital punishment, and reverse discrimination.
With his encyclopedic mind, he would amass and marshall facts
with the pertinacity of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. He
would not believe in these systems any more than he believed in the
value of his own books, including his monumental dictionary and
his impeccable edition of Shakespeare. But he would value them as
the expansion of man's reason to make short gains. In their dislike
and mistrust of all systems, an intriguing similarity exists between
Johnson and Nietzsche. Nietzsche would believe that Rawls, Ri-
chards, Dworkin, and Unger each had devised systems simply to
justify their feelings and sentiments. Along this line, Nietzsche
wrote: "That which philosophers called 'giving a basis to morality,'
and endeavoured to realise, has, . . . proved merely a learned form
of good faith in prevailing morality, a new means of its expression
. . . ."1" As to the supremacy of sentiment, Johnson's rival Hume
claimed, well before Nietzsche, that reason is the slave of passion."
The system developed by Professors Harold D. Lasswell and
Myres S. McDougal helps to overcome predilections, or at least to
face up to them, and to move the study of policy in the direction of
a science. It is the most useful contribution to jurisprudence of
recent times. They describe this system as law, science, and policy.
It is a creative and challenging analysis for lawyers who seek to
reach results that are harmonious with democracy and human dig-
nity. Operational indices bring this system to the aid of vast ma-
59. Harries, Book Review, 85 YALE L.J. 847, 853 (1976).
60. R. UNGER, supra note 55, at 1 n.1 (citing W. BATE, THE BURDEN OF THE PAST AND
THE ENGLISH POEr 3-11 (1972)).
61. F. NIETzscHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 104 (H. Zimmern trans. 1967).
62. For an introductory essay on the problems of feeling and its connection with reason,
see Passmore, David Hume, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERIcANA 491 (1968). See also Gardiner,
Hume's Theory of the Passions, in DAVID HUME 31 (D. Pears ed. 1963).
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terials in the positive law, such as property, crimes, and problems
of world order. One of the system's chief features is that it requires
the participants, as well as the observers, to clarify their values and
to identify their sentiments, their feelings, and the "imaginations"
that troubled Johnson. A short excerpt from an early statement
gives a sample of the richness of the thinking of Lasswell and
McDougal:
A first indispensable step toward the effective reform of legal education
is to clarify ultimate aim. We submit this basic proposition: if legal education
in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the needs of a free and
productive commonwealth, it must be conscious, efficient, and systematic
training for policy-making. The proper function of our law schools is, in short,
to contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more complete
achievement of the democratic values that constitute the professed ends of
American polity."
Among its values this system has rectitude. This is a rather awk-
ward word, but it permits those among the legal community who
hold religious and metaphysical beliefs, as did Johnson, to work
within this system. Its genius has captivated not only American and
English lawyers but also lawyers throughout the world.
Johnson died without a satisfactory philosophy, but with a
sound faith. Even here, there is a touch of the pathos evident in the
Reynolds portrait, for Johnson in his religion did not enjoy the full
sense of salvation that came to the French Christian moralist, Fran-
cois Mauriac, who, in his last days, stated that any glory he received
through winning the Nobel Prize was nothing compared to the glory
that awaited him in heaven. Instead, towards his end, Johnson
wrote a first-class short elegy on the death of an obscure pharmacist
who served the poor. As Johnson lay dying, afraid of the last judg-
ment, he called to the surgeons to bleed him, and cried: "Deeper,
deeper,-I want length of life, and you are afraid of giving me pain,
which I do not value."" If Johnson were alive today, he surely would
find comfort and companionship from the writings of Jung and
Barth, who had the stronger mental power that Johnson sensed in
Hume. Johnson also would enjoy the neo-natural law thinkers who
also are still struggling with Hume and would have brought their
thoughts to the large, important audience of the legal profession. In
his day, Johnson wrote the jurisprudential lectures that Sir Robert
Chambers delivered as the Vinerian lectures at Oxford." With what
63. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943).
64. W. BATE, supra note 26, at 60.
65. When the professorship of law at Oxford was founded in 1758 by the bequest of
Charles Viner, the first appointment to the endowed chair was William Blackstone. The first
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zest Johnson would take on the legal profession today!
volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of England was an expansion of his Vinerian
lectures. When Blackstone resigned the professorship in 1766, he was succeeded by Robert
Chambers, a timid 28 year-old scholar who had been Blackstone's understudy. As Bate
describes the young man's dilemma:
Over the summer [of 1766] Chambers began to panic. Try as he would, he could
not get started [writing the lectures] . . . . He was paralyzed at the thought of the
comparison people would make between his lectures and those of Blackstone. Moreover,
since Blackstone had already covered the whole field so authoritatively, how could he
avoid simply repeating Blackstone unless he fell back on one of the two alternatives,
neither of them commendable, to which human nature resorts under such
circumstances? That is, to give up comprehensiveness, and retreat to a specialized
corner and develop that; or else to try to turn some of Blackstone upside down for the
sake of novelty and carry on a running quibble with him.
W. BATE, supra note 2, at 419. At Chambers' desperate request, Johnson took a coach to
Oxford in the fall of 1766 and stayed for a month, studying Chambers' books and notes and
helping him overcome his "writer's block." Over the next three years, Johnson frequently
visited Chambers in Oxford and borrowed the latter's books when working on the lectures at
his London residence. Id. at 420. The extent of Johnson's contribution to the lectures is not
known, as the two men kept their collaboration a closely guarded secret.
[Chambers] was haunted with . . . fear-the profound humiliation if it were known
that the Vinerian Professor at Oxford, the successor of Blackstone, had been forced to
rely on a man who was not only without legal training but also one who had attended
college for scarcely more than a year . . . . Johnson, completely understanding the
situation, . . . conscientiously destroyed Chamber's letters to him . . . .
Id. at 420. Not even Boswell knew about Johnson's Vinerian project. Id. at 418. When Cham-
bers stepped down from his chair in 1774, however, the manuscript of his Vinerian lectures
totaled some 1600 pages, at least some of which bore the stamp of Johnson's "logical cleanli-
ness and forcefulness of phrase." Id. at 420, 426.
The reason for Johnson's unremunerated support of the young professor is a matter of
considerable speculation, but Bate explains that "[a]s so often when he met young men
entering the law . . . [Johnson's] own frustrations at not entering the law led him to identify
with them, and to take a generous, vicarious pleasure in their careers." Id. at 418. For an
exhaustive treatment of Johnson's contribution to the law, authored by the man who discov-
ered the Johnson-Chambers collaboration, see E. McADAM, DR. JOHNSON AND THE ENGLISH
LAw (1951) (cited in W. BATE, supra note 2, at 418 n.15).
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